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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
River flood events cause large economic damages 
and casualties requiring public and private stake-
holders to manage flood risk. Flood risk constantly 
changes due to amongst others, urbanization of pre-
viously uninhabited areas, deterioration of existing 
protection structures and climate change  (Merz, et 
al. 2010; Novoa, 2013). As a consequence flood risk 
management strategies have to be continuously 
reevaluated and updated if necessary.   
To cope with these challenges, decision makers 
have a plethora of possible risk reduction measures 
to choose from. These can be divided into structural 
measures, which physically restrain floodwaters 
(e.g. dams, dikes, local flood barriers, sand bags), 
and non-structural measures (e.g. early warning sys-
tem). In this paper only structural measures are con-
sidered.  
The nature of structural measures varies greatly in 
terms of cost, size of the protected area and time re-
quired for implementation etc. Large dams protect 
whole flood plains and often require over a decade 
from inception of planning to operation. On the oth-
er extreme, local flood barriers protect areas up to a 
neighborhood and require only few months for im-
plementation.  
In flood prone areas flood risk management is of-
ten achieved through a combination of hierarchically 
integrated defense structures, which together form a 
comprehensive flood protection system (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of hierarchical flood protec-
tion system. 
 
The geographical reach of each protection struc-
ture is different. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchical 
protection system from the perspective of an indi-
vidual exposure, i.e. the exposure is protected by one 
structure on each hierarchical level.  
When the whole river system is considered, a dif-
ferent picture is encountered, as each hierarchical 
level may entail a number of structures (see Figure 
2).  
The integration of several protection hierarchies 
can be permanent or temporal. Examples of situation 
where the integration is temporal include the con-
struction of large-scale defense structure, where 
complementing measures at a lower hierarchical 
level might be needed while the main structure is 
under construction. 
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Figure 2. Hierarchical flood protection system. 
 
A permanent protection hierarchy can be of use in 
situations where the planning of risk management 
strategy is complicated by uncertainty about the evo-
lution of risk over time, e.g. due to climate change or 
urbanization of previously uninhabited areas. In this 
situation large structures, which need to be planned 
far in advance, can be complemented by smaller 
flexible structures which can be quickly implement-
ed and updated if and when changing risk would re-
quire it. Temporal or permanent, in either situation 
decision makers are requested to identify the optimal 
flood protection system configuration for a river ba-
sin.  
In current practice, structures are often optimized 
individually, that is, without considering potential 
benefits of having several hierarchically integrated 
structures. It is here argued that it is beneficial to 
jointly consider all hierarchically integrated protec-
tion structures in a river system. The advantages of a 
joint evaluation of flood risk reduction measures are 
recognized in literature, see Dawson et al. 2004. and 
Nehlsen & Wilke 2007. 
1.2 Hierarchical decision making 
Hierarchical decision making is here understood as a 
decision process which considers several hierarchi-
cally integrated components of a system. In contrast, 
single component decision making only considers 
one component at a time. In the context of flood pro-
tection systems, the components are protection struc-
tures. 
Hierarchical decision making has been researched 
in several other topical areas, such as structural en-
gineering (Vadde et al. 1994) , mechanical engineer-
ing    (Kuppuraju et al. 1985)  and infrastructure 
management (Gómez et al. 2013). It is noted, that in 
these papers hierarchy has a different connotation as 
it refers to a system and hierarchically subordinated 
subsystems, i.e. components, whereas in the present 
paper hierarchy refers to a number of components 
which are hierarchically integrated.  
In the context of flood protection system, hierar-
chical decision making presents several benefits in 
comparison to single structure decision making, as it 
allows approaching questions that can otherwise not 
be answered. In the following four instances are de-
scribed, where the utilization of a hierarchical con-
sideration is beneficial.  
1) When a decision maker is responsible for only 
one protection structure, it allows identifying the 
optimal decision alternative for the structure in 
his responsibility under consideration of all other 
structures in the protection system. The decision 
maker may also consider possible future changes 
on other hierarchical levels of the protection sys-
tem, and optimized its structure accordingly. An 
example of such a situation is a company that 
has to decide how to best protect its facilities 
from floods under consideration of the govern-
ment’s present and future flood risk reducing ac-
tions. 
2) Decision makers have to identify on which hier-
archical level risk reduction measures are most 
beneficial.  This situation can be encountered 
e.g. when central government has to decide to 
which local entity to allocate money for flood 
risk management. 
3) Decision makers want to identify the optimal 
configuration of the flood protection system, 
which is found through a joint optimization of all 
hierarchically integrated protection structures. 
4) Decision makers want to consider, and if neces-
sary plan, risk reduction capacity in a flood pro-
tection system. As previously mentioned, such a 
situation is encountered when large protection 
structures are constructed but the future evolu-
tion of flood risk is uncertain. 
1.3 Challenges 
Little research is found in regard to hierarchical de-
cision making in the context of flood risk manage-
ment. Whereas the necessity of a joint consideration 
of flood risk protection structure is acknowledged in  
Dawson et al. 2004, the challenges for solving such 
a decision problem are not found in literature. In the 
following three challenges are identified and de-
scribed. 
Firstly, flood risk reduction decision making gen-
erally involves hydrodynamic modeling which is 
computationally expensive. Each alternative flood 
protection system configuration needs to be consid-
ered separately in the hydrodynamic model. Moreo-
ver, the accurate evaluation of flood risk may require 
the modeling of breaching scenario for each pro-
spective protection structure, see Dawson et al. 
2005, bringing the required number of runs of the 
hydrodynamic model to prohibitive levels. As a con-
sequence an efficient modeling framework is re-
quired which allows reducing the computational 
costs of hydrodynamic modeling.   
A second challenge is identified in dealing with 
probabilistic dependencies at different hierarchical 
levels. In particular, when flood damages are aggre-
gated from a low spatial scale to a higher scale it has 
to be considered that damage distribution are de-
pendent, e.g. on epistemic uncertainty parameter, 
and can thus not be simply convoluted. Although a 
well known problem, a computationally efficient so-
lution is not readily at hand.   
Lastly, it is important to identify in which situa-
tions the hierarchical consideration is particularly 
relevant. It is mathematically trivial that hierarchical 
consideration, when compared to single structure 
consideration, generally leads to lower costs and 
thus more beneficial system configuration. Never-
theless, the added benefit of utilizing the hierarchical 
consideration may vary depending on the analyzed 
system and its uncertainties. In particular, the benefit 
of hierarchical decision model might depend on the 
epistemic uncertainty of hazard, the epistemic uncer-
tainty of the spatial distribution on exposure, the de-
gree of spatial concentration of the exposure and to 
the uncertainty in exposure’s vulnerability. 
1.4 Paper outline 
This paper takes on the third challenge. By consider-
ing all hierarchically integrated structures in a pro-
tection system it aims at identifying for which uncer-
tainty parameterizations, large upstream protection 
structures are more beneficial than local downstream 
protection structures and vice versa.  In this regard, 
several hypotheses are formulated and tested 
through a sensitivity analysis in respect to several 
uncertainty parameters. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, a 
decision model for hierarchical decision making is 
introduced. Thereafter an example is presented and 
several of its parameters are varied in the aforemen-
tioned sensitivity analysis. Further the results are 
presented and discussed, followed by conclusions. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
A decision model for hierarchical decision making 
in the context of flood risk reduction is introduced. 
2.1 Decision alternatives 
A system with L  hierarchically integrated protection 
levels is considered. The decision alternatives at the 
l -th hierarchical level, 1,2,...,l L , are  (0) (1) ( ), ,..., ml l l lA a a a , where (0)la  identifies the “no 
action” alternative, i.e. the status quo.  
Each protection level might include a number of  
structures which operate in parallel and can be im-
plemented independently from each other (as illus-
trated in Figure 2). Note that decision alternatives do 
not represent the state of an individual structure, but 
rather all mutually exclusive combinations of states 
of all structures on a hierarchical level. For instance, 
if hierarchical level l  includes s  individual struc-
tures and each individual structure can be in two mu-
tually exclusive states, lA  will include 2sm  deci-
sion alternatives.  
A decision alternative for the whole protection 
system is represented by ( )a  which combine a deci-
sion alternative for each hierarchical level as  1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2, ,...,L Li i i i i iLa a aa . The set of different 
decision alternatives for the whole protection system 
is  1 2( , ,..., ) 1 2, ,...,Li i i LA i i i a . Depending on the deci-
sion problem, constraints might be introduced on A , 
e.g. if the decision maker only have control over one 
hierarchical level. 
2.2 Decision model 
The vector  1 2, ,..., NX X XX  contains all random 
variable influencing the decision problem. Moreover 
all other parameters influencing the decision, which 
are not considered random, are collected in vector 
 1 2, ,..., n  γ . 
The cost of decision alternative 1 2( , ,..., )Li i ia  are 
modeled as  1 2( , ,..., ) , ,Li i iC a γ X . In general  C   in-
cludes the net present value of construction costs 
and the flood damages over the lifetime of the struc-
ture. The expected costs  1 2( , ,..., ) ,Li i ic a γ  are calculat-
ed as  
   1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ), , ,L Li i i i i ic E C   Xa γ a γ X . (1) 
The optimal system configurations A a  minimiz-
es costs from Equation (1), and is found as  
     1 2( , ,..., ), min , ,Li i i
A
c c E C      Xγ a γ a γ X .  (2) 
3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the sensitivity analysis introduced in 
the following is to assess in which situations the hi-
erarchical optimization is most beneficial, i.e. test 
the hypotheses introduced at the end of this section.  
3.1 Model setup 
3.1.1 Introduction 
An example is developed for an area in Switzerland. 
Whereas a real digital elevation model (DEM) and 
course of the river Aar are utilized, the hazard, expo-
sure and the nature of protection structures are pos-
tulated.  
The study area is divided into grid cells with a 
resolution of 200 m; hazard and exposure are calcu-
lated respectively distributed at a grid cell level. A 
flood protection system with two hierarchically inte-
grated protection structures is considered.  On the 
upstream hierarchical level a dike is considered 
whereas on the downstream hierarchical level local 
flood barriers (LFB, see e.g. Bramley & Bowker 
2002) are considered. The portfolio of exposure, i.e. 
the property that might get affected by floods, is dis-
tributed over the study area. A schematic representa-
tion of the study area is given in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the study area. 
 
In the example the future evolution of climate is 
considered a major source of hazard uncertainty. 
Two climate scenarios are postulated and it is as-
sumed that a decision in regard to either protection 
structure can be taken at present time or at one time 
in the future when further information on climatic 
evolution is available.  
To allow general conclusions to be drawn, a large 
number of different parameterizations of the exam-
ple model, i.e. combinations of parameters in vector 
γ ,  are considered and the average tendencies are 
investigated.   
3.1.2 Upstream hierarchical level 
It is assumed that a dike with 5 m height already ex-
ists and the decision makers have the choice to leave 
the dike unchanged (decision alternative (0)1a ) or up-
grade the dike’s height to 7 m (decision alternative 
(1)
1a ). The construction costs are postulated as  0
1 0cc   for (0)1a  and   1 81 10cc  CHF for  (1)1a . If the 
dike is upgraded the construction time is assumed to 
be 10ct   years and the lifetime is assumed to be 
100T   years. The area protected by the dike com-
prises the whole flood plain and thus all exposures.  
3.1.3 Downstream hierarchical level 
The decision maker has the possibility to install lo-
cal flood barriers to complement the dike. It is con-
sidered that a LFB protects one grid cell and as such, 
an independent decision is taken for each grid cell. 
Thus, the number of decision alternatives for the 
downstream hierarchical level is 2K  where K  is the 
number of grid cells.  The protection height of an 
LFB  is 1.5LFBh  m and the construction costs for a 
single LFB are 610LFBcc  CHF. As for the dike, the 
lifetime of LFBs is 100T   years; the construction 
period is disregarded as it is comparatively short.  
3.1.4 Exposure portfolio 
The spatial distribution of exposure in the portfolio 
has a large impact on the result of the decision mod-
el. To allow drawing general conclusions, the influ-
ence of a particular spatial distribution on the results 
should be minimized. For this reason, for each mod-
el run a different exposure distribution is considered 
and the average tendency investigated. The different 
realizations of exposure distribution are created ac-
cording to the parameterization and methodology in-
troduced in the following.   
The total value of exposure, totv , is postulated 
and distributed to a certain number, PTFK , of grid 
cells. The number of grid cells with exposure is 
modeled as PTF dK K  , where K  is the total 
number of grid cells. Thus parameter d  controls the 
degree of spatial dispersion of exposure. The expo-
sure value attributed to the k -th grid cell  is kV , the 
value attributed to grid cells with exposure is 
k tot PTFv v n , all other grid cells will have no expo-
sure value on them, thus 0kv  . A realization of ex-
posure distribution is  , 1,...,kv k K   . Note that 
in each realization of exposure distribution the grid 
cells to which the exposure is allocated are randomly 
selected.  
In many situations the decision maker’s 
knowledge about the exact location of exposures is 
lacking; to consider the degree of knowledge of the 
decision maker, the parameter 1u  N  is intro-
duced; it stands for the number of equally likely ex-
posure distribution considered in the decision model. 
As such, if 1u   only one realization of exposure 
distribution is considered, i.e. the knowledge about 
the portfolio is perfect. On the other hand, if u   
and   is large knowledge about the spatial distribu-
tion of exposure is very limited and uncertainty high. 
The optimal decision is found under consideration of 
  different spatial distributions of exposure. Each of 
the u  exposure distributions considered in one deci-
sion problem have the same totv  and d , the differ-
ence lays in which grid cells carry the exposure. As 
mentioned these are randomly selected for each ex-
posure distribution.  
3.1.5 Digital elevation model 
The digital elevation model DHM25/200 from the 
Swiss Federal Office of Topography, swisstopo, is 
utilized; its resolution is 200 m. Digital elevation 
model are associated with an inherent uncertainty, 
from measurement errors as well as from the eleva-
tion distribution within a grid cell. The latter is con-
sidered through the standard deviation DEM . For 
each grid cell k , an uncertainty term  , ~ 0,DEM k DEMN   is added to the elevation given 
in the DEM, ,DEM kh , such that 
, , ,DEM k DEM k DEM kH h   . The term ,DEM k  is modeled 
independently for each grid cell. 
3.1.6 Hazard 
First the modeling of flood events is described; 
thereafter considerations on climate change and its 
parameterization are introduced.  
Flood events , 1,...,jE e j J   are considered in 
the example. The model considers the annual most 
critical flood space which is divided into 9J   flood 
events. For each event the river discharge time series 
is postulated at the upstream boundary of the study 
area. The shape of the discharge time series is as-
sumed to be the same for each event, with a constant 
base flow of 100baseQ  m3/s and a triangular peak as 
illustrate in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Schematic representation of the modeled discharge 
time series. 
 
Whereas time 200'000peakT  s, peak discharges 
j,maxQ  vary for each event je , as follows 
100j,maxQ j   m3/s (3) 
The yearly probability, jP E e   , of occurrence  
of event je  is modeled according to Equation (4). 
 exp , 1,...,9
!
j
jP E e jj
       . (4) 
The river discharge serves as input into the hydro-
dynamic model,  LISFLOOD-FP  (P. D. Bates & De 
Roo 2000), which models river runoff as well as 
flood plain inundation. The hydrodynamic model is 
run for each combination of event je  and decision 
alternative  11ia  on the upstream hierarchical level. 
From each model run a hazard map is obtained, i.e. 
the inundation depth   1, 1 ,ih k jw a e  for each grid cell 
k  in the study area. 
Note that the structures at downstream hierar-
chical level, i.e. LFBs, are not included in the hy-
drodynamic model, but are considered through sim-
ple manipulation of hazard maps. The water depth, 
, ,h LFB kw , when an LFB is installed is found as fol-
lows:  
  , , ,
, , , ,
0,
, .
h LFB k h k LFB
h LFB k h k h k LFB
w w h
w w w h
   
  (5) 
This is justifiable as it is thought that LFB have a 
limited impact on the large scale hydrodynamic 
flows and can thus be omitted from the hydrody-
namic model. 
The uncertainty term of the DEM is considered in 
a similar manner. Small changes in the DEM are ex-
pected to translate directly into the same change in 
the inundation depth, therefore the uncertainty term 
is subtracted directly from the inundation depth 
yielded by the hydrodynamic model. Thus for grid 
cell k  the inundation depth will be: 
, , ,h k h k DEM kW w  . The inundation depth with an 
LFB installed, , ,h LFB kW , is calculated analogously.  
In the following the focus is shifted to the consid-
eration of climate change. As previously mentioned, 
the future evolution of climate is considered as a 
source of hazard uncertainty. In this example two 
possible climates are modeled, namely 1    as 
the base scenario with constant climate and 2    
as a scenario with climate change. To impact of the 
climate scenario on hazard is considered through pa-
rameter   in equation (4) which takes values  1 0.2     and  2 1    . Furthermore it 
is modeled that a decision in regard to either struc-
ture is taken at present time 0t t  under considera-
tion that the decision regarding either structure can 
be delayed to one point in the future ( 1t t ). In this 
example 1 25t   is postulated. 
At time 0t t  the prior degree of belief of the cur-
rent climate is  1P  . By time 1t t ,  1P   can be 
updated with new evidence, aggregated in the indi-
cator Z , which can take values and  1 2,Z    . 
The likelihoods of each climate scenario given indi-
cator are postulated as: 1 1 0.9P Z          and 
2 2 0.9P Z         .  
3.1.7 Vulnerability 
The vulnerability model expresses the damage de-
gree kD , i.e. the damage in grid cell k  as a ratio of 
exposure value kV , in function of the inundation 
depth with a logistic function as per Equation (6) 
e
1k
D
e

  , (6) 
where ,h ka W b     and 1a  , 6b   . ,h kW  is 
straightforwardly substituted with , ,h LFB kW  when a 
LFB is installed in the grid cell.  
For event je  and decision alternative  a  the 
flood loss, i.e. damage in monetary terms, given ex-
posure distribution   is 
  
1
, ,
K
j k k
k
L e v D

a .  (7) 
3.1.8 Costs of decision alternative  
In this example the vector γ  contains the following 
elements:   1, , , ,DEM u d totP v     . The vector X  
contains the elements  , ,DEM EX Δ V  where DEMΔ  
is the vector containing the uncertainty term of the 
digital elevation model , , 1,...,DEM k k K  , V  is a 
vector containing the exposure value , 1,...,kV k K  
for each grid cell. 
Yearly expected costs   ,tc a γ  for  decision al-ternative  a  are calculated according to Equation 
(1) under consideration of construction costs en-
tailed by  a  and the results of Equation (4) and 
Equation (7). Thereafter, the expected life time costs  ( ) ,c a γ  for decision alternative  a  are calculated 
by summing the net present value of yearly expected 
costs over 100T  years, i.e. 
     ( ) ( )
1
, ,
T
t
t
c c r t 

 a γ a γ . (8) 
where  is a discounting function , ri  
is the discounting rate, which is postulated to be 
4%ri  , and 0t  is present time. 
When calculating the costs of a decision alterna-
tive it has to be considered that it might entail differ-
ent protection system configuration over time, e.g. 
during construction time of the main structure, or if 
it is decided to modify the protection structure at 
time 1t t . 
3.2 Parameterization 
The results presented in the next section are based 
on 50 '000rn   model runs. In each model run the 
values of the parameters in vector γ  are varied. Al-
so, realizations of X  are randomly generated for 
each model run. Note that whereas the decision 
model is run for each realization of γ , this is not the 
case for each realization of X  because these are ran-
dom variables as per Equation (2). 
3.3 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses tested in the sensitivity analyses are 
listed in the following.  
3.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis is that upstream structures are 
more beneficial when the uncertainty about the spa-
tial distribution of the portfolio is large. 
Here, the decision space A  is constrained such  
that only one structure is optimized at a time. The 
hypothesis is tested by comparing  upc γ  and  downc γ  i.e. to expected costs when flood risk reduc-
tion measures are implemented on the upstream hi-
erarchical level and on the downstream hierarchical 
level respectively.  
3.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis states that upstream struc-
tures are more beneficial when the dispersion of the 
portfolio is large.  The testing of this hypothesis is 
analogous to hypothesis 1.  
3.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis states that downstream struc-
tures are more beneficial when DEM uncertainty is 
large. The testing of this hypothesis is analogous to 
hypothesis 1.  
4 RESULTS 
In the following the model results are presented for 
the formulated hypotheses. The results of  model run 
1,..., ri n  comprise the minimized costs    iupc γ  and    idownc γ  which, when compared, allow to test the 
hypotheses formulated in the previous section. The 
comparison is facilitated by calculating ratio 
,c s,1 s,2r       which expresses the ratio between the 
number of model runs yielding ( ) ( )i iup downc c  and the 
total number of runs given ( )is,1 s s,2      
( ) ( ) ( )
1
( )
1
,
r
r
n
i i i
up down s,1 s s,2
i
c s,1 s,2 n
i
s,1 s s,2
i
I c c
r
I
  
 
  


      
   


,  (9) 
where  I    is an indicator function, which returns 1 
when the statement in brackets is true and 0 other-
wise, s  is the element of γ  which is considered in the sensitivity analysis and s,1 , s,2  are two values 
delimiting a bin.   
Figure 5 illustrates the results of the sensitivity 
analysis in regard to u , by plotting s u   against  
cr .  
 
 
Figure 5. The ratio cr as a function of parameter u . 
 
Similarly, Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the ratio 
cr   for  s DEM   and s d   respectively. 
 
  0( )( ) 1 t trr t i   
 
Figure 6. The ratio cr  as a function of parameter DEM .  
 
 
Figure 7. The ratio cr  as a function of parameter d . 
5 DISCUSSION 
In the following results are discussed in the light of 
the hypotheses formulated in Section 3.  
A lack of knowledge in regard to the spatial dis-
tribution of exposure, i.e. a large value for u , a dike 
is more beneficial than the installation of LFBs 
(Figure 5). This reckoning is relevant e.g. in devel-
oping countries where the location of exposure is of-
ten unknown.  
Similar observations are made in regard to the 
spatial dispersion of the portfolio (Figure 6). When 
dispersion is large, a dike becomes more beneficial 
compared to LFBs.  The reason for this is found to 
be that concentrated portfolios present higher expo-
sure value per grid cell and thus the relatively cheap 
protection offered by LFBs is very effective whereas 
in dispersed portfolios, exposure value per cell is 
lower and expected damages for the cell cannot jus-
tify the expense for the construction of a LFB.  
The analysis in regard to DEM  (Figure 7) con-
firms the third hypothesis as it indicates downstream 
structures, i.e. LFB, are more beneficial then up-
stream structures when  DEM  is large. The reason is 
found to be that the benefit of LFB is mostly unaf-
fected by an increase in uncertainty in the DEM, 
whereas the benefit of the dike decreases. LFB are 
unaffected by DEM uncertainty because they are in-
stalled locally, i.e. at the same geographical scale as 
DEM uncertainty is modeled. LFB are simply built 
on top of the uncertain terrain and thus offer protec-
tion up to LFBh  over the terrain irrespective of DEM . 
Similar analyses are also undertaken in regard to  1P  . Results do not indicate any sensitivity in re-
gard to  1P  .  
The results confirm that epistemic uncertainty 
impact the result of hierarchical decision making. In 
particular the hierarchical level on which risk reduc-
ing measures are most beneficial may change de-
pending on the magnitude of epistemic uncertainty. 
One implication of this finding is that a better under-
standing of the system, e.g. through collection of da-
ta, can lead to a completely different protection sys-
tem.  
Many aspects of the here presented example 
model are simplified, particularly the flood risk 
model underlying the decision model. In further 
studies a more sophisticated flood risk model should 
be utilized, for instance considering the probability 
of breaching of protection structures. Such consider-
ation will require solving the challenge related to 
large computation time of hydrodynamic model 
mentioned in the introduction.  Nevertheless it is 
noted that the presented model can be readily uti-
lized in practical cases to identify on which hierar-
chical level flood risk reduction measures are most 
beneficial.  
Further, efforts should be undertaken to extend 
the model to more hierarchical levels and to more 
decision alternatives per structure. Also, the models 
behavior with other hazard and orographic condi-
tions should be tested.  
Currently it is considered that the decisions can 
only be taken at times 0t t  and 1t t  , in reality the 
decision can be taken at any time when new evi-
dence becomes available. A methodology to extend 
the decision model to more time steps can be found 
in Nishijima & Anders 2012. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In many situations flood risk is reduced through a 
combination of several risk reduction measures. In 
the case of structural measures, these might be hier-
archically integrated to form a comprehensive flood 
protection system. Nevertheless, in current practice 
protection structures are often evaluated and opti-
mized individually without considering the possibil-
ity of having several hierarchically integrated pro-
tection structures. In contrast, it is here argued that it 
is beneficial to jointly consider all hierarchically in-
tegrated protection structures in a river system. The 
situations, in which hierarchical consideration might 
be helpful, are given in the introduction alongside 
several challenges encountered in  hierarchical deci-
sion making. 
Hierarchical decision model allows approaching 
questions which could not be approached in a single 
structure decision model. For instance it allows deci-
sion makers to identify on which hierarchical level 
protection measures are most beneficial, e.g. to allo-
cate money accordingly. For such a situation a sensi-
tivity analysis is carried out. In particular it is ana-
lyzed what influence the epistemic uncertainty has 
on the benefit of large upstream structures (e.g. dike) 
versus local downstream protection structures (e.g. 
local flood barrier). Moreover, the same analysis is 
carried out in regard to the degree of dispersion of 
the portfolio. 
 The analysis shows that benefit of structures may 
vary depending on the magnitude of epistemic un-
certainty. Although it cannot be concluded that large 
epistemic uncertainty automatically favors large up-
stream protection structures, the findings are quite 
clear. When exposure is spatially dispersed and its 
spatial distribution uncertain, a dike is generally 
more favorable then local flood barriers, whereas 
concentrated exposure with a well-known spatial 
distribution favors local flood barriers. Uncertainty 
in the digital elevation model renders large upstream 
protection structures less attractive, and thus favors 
local flood barriers. 
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